Monday, June 8, 2015

WWBS - What Would Bill Say?

Elise Andrew's legions of parrots might want to update their statuses from “I F****** Love Science” to “It's Complicated.”

What would William "Bill" Nye say? More importantly, what should Bill say? To put it another way, what ought any self-respecting (albeit self-proclaimed) “science guy” (or gal) say about the strange case of Bruce (“Caitlyn”) Jenner?



A plausible scientific starting-point would be to simply ask the following questions. What are the relevant genes? Is the sex-determining gene an 'x' or a 'y'?

“How is Bruce Jenner a woman? ...[Presumably, h]is DNA is that of a man.”[1]

I thought that it was Sci-way or the highway?

Suddenly, it seems that it's: “Genetics? Schmenetics!”

“Reality is outlawed. Illusion rules our supposedly science-based, post-modernist world.”[2]



Notes:



[1] Michael Hoffman, “Bruce Jenner is Not a Woman: He’s a Chemically and Surgically Castrated Female Impersonator,” Revisionist History, June 4, 2015, <http://revisionistreview.blogspot.com/2015/06/bruce-jenner-is-not-woman.html>.

[2]Ibid.

Disclaimer: The topmost image lays a caption over Bill Nye's visage for dramatic purposes. It is meant to be ironic. So far as I can ascertain, Bill Nye never uttered or otherwise communicate the words that are therein displayed.

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

Jesus 'Never Said Anything' About Homosexuality?



(Source: http://loltheists.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/jesus-on-being-gay.png.)

Here we see another example of (what I have termed) a “Facebook Polemic.”[i]

Obviously this polemic asserts that Jesus didn’t “say anything” about homosexuality.

Is this an argument? One way to lay out this complaint in argument form would be as follows.

1. If Jesus does not explicitly mention an activity, then that activity is permissible.

2. Jesus never mentions homosexual sex.

3. Therefore, homosexual sex is permissible.

There are a number of problems with this argument. I will list three.[ii]

Number one, Jesus never mentioned a number of other, obviously morally wrong acts. For example, Jesus never mentioned torturing children.[iii] However, it would obviously be unacceptable to conclude, from this observation alone, that torturing children is thereby permissible.[iv] The mere fact that Jesus never mentioned homosexual sex is therefore insufficient reason to conclude that homosexual sex is permissible.

Number two, no reasons have been given to think that what Jesus does not say should be given priority over what other biblical authors, for example Paul, did say.[v] In other words, why should a Christian limit his or her consultation on moral matters to the recorded words of Jesus? After all, Christians have historically held that the entire Bible is a reliable (if sometimes obscure) moral guide.[vi]

Number three, it is arguable that Jesus did indeed mention homosexual sin after all.

Firstly, Jesus mentions Sodom and Gomorrah in various passages (e.g., Matthew 10:15, 11:23ff, Luke 10:12, & 17:29). If “Sodom and Gomorrah” is, as is traditionally understood – an allusion to homosexual sin, that is, sodomy – then these references would plausibly be sufficient to deny the assertion that Jesus “never said anything about homosexuality.”

Secondly, Jesus explicitly endorsed the definition of marriage, first set forth in the book of Genesis,[vii] as an arrangement between a man and woman. According to Jesus “[A]t the beginning of creation God ‘made them male and female [Gen. 1:27].’ ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh [Gen. 2:24].’” Hence, we might ask, “Why should Jesus need to (redundantly) forbid what he has already excluded in virtue of his definition of marriage?”



[i] For an explanation of this term, see: http://bellofchurch.blogspot.com/2012/06/facebook-polemics.html.

[ii] A more subtle worry than those discussed above lies with the first premise. A person who advocates the permissibility of same-sex sexual behavior likely favors a principle such as that which constitutes premise 1: “Whatever is not explicitly forbidden [in Scripture or by Jesus, etc.] is permissible.” However, selection of this sort of principle – called a “regulative principle” – needs to be justified. Insofar as the reason for the selection is simply the desirability of a particular conclusion, the principle seems to be ad hoc. The opponent of same-sex sexual behaviors might adopt a different regulative principle. For instance, why not prefer: “Whatever is not expressly commanded [in Scripture or by Jesus, etc.] is forbidden”? (For more on regulative principles, see Robert C. Walton, Chronological and Background Charts of Church History, Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1986, chart 42.)

The choice of regulative principle is, plausibly, at least as controversial as the judgment regarding the permissibility of same-sex sexual behavior activity.

[iii] Jesus does not explicitly mention suicide either. Many (although probably not all) Christians would be sympathetic to the view that suicide is sinful. However, this judgment arises out of such considerations as the Bible’s overall respect for human life, emphasis upon the sovereignty of God in all matter and prohibition of taking life without just cause – chiefly with the aim of preserving life (as in extreme cases of self-defense).

[iv] I anticipate, at this point, that a hostile interlocutor will want distinguish between “harmful” and “harmless” acts, in such a way that that homosexual sex will be considered “harmless.” I have treated this at greater length elsewhere. Suffice it to say, here, that on the historic Christian view, a human being is possessed of both a body and a soul. “Harm” then can come to either the body or the soul, or both. Jesus himself warns: “Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in hell”, Matthew 10:28, NIV.

However, plausibly, “sin” can be defined as (something like) “a transgression of God’s law that harms the soul.” If so, then if homosexual sex is a sin, then homosexual sex harms the soul. But if that is so, then it will not be the case that homosexual sex is “harmless.”

It must first be shown that homosexual sex is not a sin before it can be shown that engaging in homosexual sex does not “harm.” For the historic Christian can merely rejoin: Homosexual sex is sinful. Whatever is sinful is harmful. Therefore, homosexual sex is harmful.

As an aside, penetrative anal sex is also arguably harmful physically. “…Anal intercourse is the riskiest form of sexual activity for several reasons, including the following: The anus lacks the natural lubrication the vagina has. Penetration can tear the tissue inside the anus, allowing bacteria and viruses to enter the bloodstream. ...The tissue inside the anus is not as well protected as the skin outside the anus. Our external tissue has layers of dead cells that serve as a protective barrier against infection. The tissue inside the anus does not have this natural protection, which leaves it vulnerable to tearing and the spread of infection. The anus was designed to hold in feces. The anus is surrounded with a ring-like muscle, called the anal sphincter, which tightens after we defecate. When the muscle is tight, anal penetration can be painful and difficult. Repetitive anal sex may lead to weakening of the anal sphincter, making it difficult to hold in feces until you can get to the toilet. ...The anus is full of bacteria. Even if both partners do not have a sexually transmitted infection or disease, bacteria normally in the anus can potentially infect the giving partner. ...Oral contact with the anus can put both partners at risk for hepatitis, herpes, HPV, and other infections. ...Even though serious injury from anal sex is not common, it can occur. Bleeding after anal sex could be due to a hemorrhoid or tear, or something more serious such as a perforation (hole) in the colon. ...The only way to completely avoid anal sex risks is to abstain from anal sex. ...”. “Anal Sex Safety and Health Concerns,” WebMD, http://www.webmd.com/sex/anal-sex-health-concerns and http://www.webmd.com/sex/anal-sex-healthconcerns?page=2.

Incidentally, this would of course apply equally to heterosexual as well as homosexual instances of anal sex.

[v] Paul wrote: “Do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the Kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: neither the sexually immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor men who practice homosexuality, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor swindlers will inherit the Kingdom of God.” (1 Corinthians chapter 6, verses 9-10.)

[vi] We could replace the phrase “the entire Bible” with other phrases like “the New Testament,” “Church doctrine” or “Holy Scripture and Sacred Tradition” in order to generate other competing principles which we have also been given no reasons to disfavor.

[vii] Chapter 2, verses 22-24.

Note: I have no clue as to whether or not Stephen Colbert actually made the remarks seemingly attributed to him in the picture-text. For all I know, the ascription is erroneous. Nothing in my reply turns on this point.

Saturday, May 30, 2015

'Evolution' Doesn't Help Those Who Won't Reproduce Themselves

4 Reasons Why Pro-Homosexual Activists Should Think That Scientists’ Alleged Discovery of an ‘Evolutionary Advantage for Homosexuality’ Is Nothing to Write Home About

Matthew J. Bell

In a recent post, one writer for the IFLScience weblog, which site is presumably an outgrowth of Elise Andrews’s provocatively-named “I F*****g Love Science” Facebook interest group, rhapsodizes about the supposed recent “discovery” of an “evolutionary advantage for homosexuality.” (<http://www.iflscience.com/plants-and-animals/scientists-discover-evolutionary-advantage-homosexual-sex>.)

Before I enumerate four reasons why this headline is overambitious and not supported by the evidence, let me briefly catalog a few of the issues about which I am not mainly interested.

Firstly, obviously the blogger assumes that there is some sort of genetic basis for homosexuality. None of my “four reasons” will contest this. I hasten to add, though, that this is not because the claim is incontestable.

As things stand presently, this is (at best) simply an assertion. In the language of philosophy, an “assertion” is a proposition that is advanced as true without (adequate) argument or evidence in its support. It is not the job of the hearer to argue against an assertion. It is, rather, the job of the speaker to provide adequate argument and evidence for her assertions. Without such argument or evidence, the hearer is under no rational obligation to respond.

To be sure, there is, among many people, a hope that a “‘gay’ gene” will be found. Indeed, it is true that there may be, among some, an expectation that one will be found. However, there is a hope and an expectation among certain children that they will be visited by the tooth fairy, Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny. Unless they are rooted in rational evidences, these hopes and expectations have little more than emotional content.

There is no demonstrable “‘gay’ gene.” In the words of the organization NARTH: “There is no evidence that shows that homosexuality is simply ‘genetic.’ And none of the research claims there is. Only the press and certain researchers do, when speaking in sound bites to the public.” (“Is There a ‘Gay Gene’?” NARTH, <http://www.narth.com/docs/istheregene.html>.)

But let this pass. For the sake of argument, I will grant that there is a “‘gay’ gene.”

Secondly, in my “four reasons” I am not going to fuss about any misstatements of fact made by the blogger. For example, in her opening sentence, Ms. Alford writes that “…researchers may have just found a benefit conferred by homosexual sex that could offer an explanation as to why this behavior has persevered…”.

The problematic bit is the phrase “conferred by homosexual sex.” Of course, none of the research cited by Alford comes even remotely close to claiming that any survival advantage is “conferred by homosexual sex.” Rather, the hypothesis is entertained that same-sex sexual behaviors (SSBs) are expressions of a genotype – call it the “‘gay’ gene” – that also expresses itself in some other, hypothetical characteristic and that this characteristic is supposed to confer survival advantage.

The difficulty here is somewhat subtle. Let me try to sharpen my point with the help of an analogy.

Consider sickle cell anemia (SCA), a disorder afflicting mainly blacks in which the sufferer may end up with low levels of bio-available oxygen due to an abnormality in the shape of his or her red blood cells. Specifically, the SCA sufferer’s red blood cells have a “sickle”-shape (hence the name). If and when low oxygen conditions arise, the SCA sufferer is said to be undergoing a “sickle cell crisis.” Often these crises can be fatal. In any event, SCA sufferer’s life expectancy is shorter than that of a non-sufferer, ceteris paribus. It follows, therefore, that it would be better to not have the SCA genotype than to have it.

But according to experts on SCA, it is also true that the genotype for SCA confers a survival advantage. To be exact, a person who has the SCA genotype (whether homo- or heterozygously) has a well-defined survival benefit. “Producing altered hemoglobin can be beneficial for inhabitants of countries afflicted with falciparum malaria, an extremely deadly parasitic disease. Sickle blood cells ‘collapse’ around the parasites and filter them out of the blood. Thus, people who carry the sickle-cell allele are more likely to recover from malarial infection.” (Ilona Miko, “Genetic Dominance: Genotype-Phenotype Relationships,” Nature, 2008, <http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/genetic-dominance-genotype-phenotype-relationships-489>.)

However – and this is my complaint about Alford’s prose – saying that the SCA genotype confers an advantage in terms of surviving malaria is not the same thing as claiming that the sufferer’s anemia is itself responsible for conferring said advantage. It’s not the anemia that confers the relevant advantage. The anemia is a possibly life-threatening condition and is an obvious survival disadvantage. Instead, what we mean to say is that the underlying genotype that produces the disadvantageous anemia also produces an advantageous protection against malaria.

Similarly, saying that a (hypothetical) “‘gay’ gene” confers an advantage in terms of heightening fertility in female offspring is not the same thing as claiming that the “homosexual sex” acts are themselves responsible for conferring said advantage. It’s not the homosexual sex that confers the relevant advantage. The homosexual sex – at least insofar as it is exclusive – is an obvious survival disadvantage. (This is obvious, even if it is not “politically-correct.” After all, there would be no “paradox” to resolve if phenotypic “homosexual traits” were conducive to reproductive success.) Instead, what we mean to say is that the underlying genotype that produces the disadvantageous homosexuality also (at least hypothetically) produces an advantageous increase in the fecundity of female offspring.

But let’s let this pass also. After all, rephrasing the point alleviates Alford’s error. So we can substitute my (albeit more prolix) expression, above, for Alford’s (which is pithy but technically inaccurate).

Thirdly, I will not be challenging the evolutionary assumptions of the article. This is not because I do not think any such challenge to be worthy, but because my “four reasons” all stand on their own even if the actual, factual claims of the article turn out to be correct.

Fourthly, readers will soon encounter numerous instances of the phrase “same-sex sexual behaviors” (sometimes abbreviated SSBs). I will not pick nits over the operative definition of these SSBs, however. Again, this is not because I think that there are no interesting questions in the vicinity (I direct readers’ attention to the fact that one of the supposed indicators of homosexual inclinations in fruit flies was flies that “sing” to other male flies), but because I think that my “four reasons” put the kibosh to any hope that this information will aid “pro-homosexual” activists – even if the information presented is true.

With this much ground cleared, let me proceed to the heart of the matter. Considering what Alford has written – and granting the truth of it – one may still be left with the impression that it’s much ado about nothing. I will give four reasons for this. (Some of the reasons fix upon peripheral points while others focus on main points. In other words, not all of these reasons will be equally weighty. They are all of some intrinsic interest, however. Or at least so say I.)

NUMBER ONE: There is a significant difference between a “discovery” and a hypothesis.

The IFLScience article headline grabs readers’ attention by asserting, basically, that things are settled: “Scientists Discover Evolutionary Advantage for Homosexuality.” As the kids say, “It’s a done-deal.” Jonas Salk discovered a vaccine for polio; Albert Szent-Györgyi discovered vitamin c; William Herschel discovered Uranus; and “Scientists” have “discovered an Evolutionary advantage for homosexuality.” End of story.

But hold on; things are not so clear-cut. Alford’s text body is far more sober than the title-line. (It is possible that she was not the one who developed the headline.)

She writes: “[R]esearchers may have just found a benefit conferred by homosexual sex that could offer an explanation as to why this behavior has persevered, at least in one species. According to a new study in fruit flies, not only does same-sex sexual behavior seem to be heritable, but females with a genetic makeup associated with this trait actually display higher reproductive rates, which is an evolutionary advantage.”

Got that? It is possible – though by no means transparent – that there is a “benefit” to possessing a (hypothetical) genotype that expresses itself partially in same-sex sexual behavior (SSB). This is based upon a study of fruit flies in which SSBs “seem to be” – but still and all might not actually be – “heritable.” Now beside the fact that the extent to which animal studies are even potentially able to tell us anything about human sexual behavior is highly controversial, to hear Alford tell it, the scientists who conducted the relevant study are not even sure about there being a genetic basis to what the fruit flies are doing.

In any case, in the interest of accuracy, the blog post should be retitled “Theorists Speculate About a Possible Evolutionary Advantage for a Hypothetical Homosexual Genotype.” Though, I admit: The revised headline is probably not going to be as successful a piece of “click-bait.”

NUMBER TWO: The author implicitly acknowledges that 99.8% of animal species have no observed traits that could be fairly glossed as “same-sex sexual behaviors.”

Of course, Ms. Alford does not put it in these terms. She writes that “homosexual behaviors …[are] observed in more than 1,500 species.” This fact (if it be such) is really not that impressive, however.

If one Googles a search string such as “how many different animal species are there in the world?” one finds that amongst the top results is Discovery’s article titled “8.74 Million Species on Earth.” (Tim Wall, Aug 23, 2011, <http://news.discovery.com/earth/plants/874-million-species-on-earth-110823.htm>.)

In it, we read the following. “Eight million, seven hundred and four thousand eukaryote species share this planet, give or take 1.3 million. …There are 1.2 million species officially registered in the Catalogue of Life and the World Register of Marine Species.”

Excluding “chromists,” “fungi,” “plants” and “protozoa” (that is, merely considering “animals”) the approximate species count is 7.77 million, “of which 953,434 have been described and cataloged.”

Contemplating only the 953,434, we see that the 1,500 species which have so far displayed SSBs amount to 0.1573% (1,500/953,434) of the total number of animal species that have been “described and cataloged.” This means that the remainder – roughly 99.8427% – either have no SSBs at all, have no observable SSBs or have yet to have their SSBs observed.

Taking stock of what we currently know, therefore, the percentage of animal species with observable SSBs is vanishingly low. Anyone who wishes to make a case for the prevalence, throughout the animal kingdom, of SSBs presently can do no better than to premise his or her argument upon expectations, hopes, speculations or wishes.

For those whose alpha and omega is supposedly self-limited to what “science says” – and isn’t this the mentality of the “IFL Science” brigade? – there is really nothing to say about SSBs amongst animal species except the following. Either one should admit that the current state of the evidence shows that fewer than 1% of species display SSBs, or one should profess more or less total ignorance about the matter (on the notion, perhaps, that the above-mentioned “descriptions” and “catalog” entries simply have not been robust enough to really speak to the question of sexual behavior).

From the point-of-view of “pro-homosexual” activism, though, the preferable route seems to be to simply concede that we simply don’t know.

NUMBER THREE: The fruit flies in which “same-sex sexual behaviors” were observed were (a.) inbred (b.) in captivity.

Moving from what we don’t know to what we do know takes us into interesting territory. According to the study’s abstract, the researchers sample set was: “…50 inbred lines derived from a wild population…”. (Jessica L. Hoskins, Michael G. Ritchie and Nathan W. Bailey, “A Test of Genetic Models for the Evolutionary Maintenance of Same-Sex Sexual Behaviour,” Proceedings of the Royal Society, May 27, 2015, <http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/282/1809/20150429>.)

Firstly, this means that the observed fruit flies were not necessarily behaving as they would in the wild. How much weight can be placed upon claims about the “naturalness” of such-and-so behavior when that behavior was observed under artificial, laboratory conditions?

Maybe the observed SSBs also occur “in nature,” maybe not. But we need a lot more than what we have in order to make that determination.

Secondly, as a different article puts it: “Inbreeding is generally frowned upon, even in the animal kingdom.” (Alex B. Berezow, “Female Fruit Flies Mate with Brothers, Dad,” Real Clear Science, Dec. 13, 2012, <http://www.realclearscience.com/journal_club/2012/12/13/female_fruit_flies_mate_with_brothers_dad_106423.html>.)

Maybe the observed SSBs would have been observed in the laboratory even if the relevant fruit flies had not been “inbred,” maybe not. But, again, we should require more by way of evidence before we simply accept that the behavior of “inbred” fruit flies tells us anything about the behavior of wild fruit flies.

Presumably, “pro-homosexual” activists are not trying to establish that SSBs can be artificially induced through selective breeding strategies (and, possibly, manipulating environmental factors). Presumably, activists are hoping that “science” will vindicate their “lifestyle choices” by justifying the label “natural.”

If so, they would be advised to look elsewhere than this study for support. Inbred fruit flies impelled to display SSBs (possibly for lack of options) in a contrived, laboratory environment hardly suffices to establish that any observed behaviors count as “natural.”

NUMBER FOUR: We should not miss the fact that the entire “evolutionary advantage” – however hypothetical – hinges upon “homosexuals” actually reproducing.

There is no getting around it. Exclusive same-sex sexual behaviors are a dead-end, in evolutionary terms.

This is why the blogger begins with the admission that the presence of SSBs is “an evolutionary paradox that’s frustratingly difficult for biologists to explain.”

Alford reports: “The final stage of the investigation involved performing experimental crosses of flies from both of these identified lines and examining the resulting offspring.” (Emphasis supplied.)

It does no good simply to allege that (the hypothetical, genotypic basis for) “homosexuality” confers an “evolutionary advantage” that is detectable in “resulting offspring” unless the “homosexuals” under review actually reproduce.

Readers find, at last, that the supposed “evolutionary advantage” is this: “Males with a genetic makeup associated with high levels of SSB produced female offspring with higher rates of reproduction, or fecundity.”

Notice a few things, however. In order for this alleged “advantage” to be displayed, “[m]ales with a genetic makeup associated with high levels of SSBs” have to reproduce. Not to put too fine a point on it, but obviously, if any male is going to reproduce then that male has to actually couple with a member of his species that is possessed of complementary sex organs. To be precise, ““[m]ales with a genetic makeup associated with high levels of SSBs” can only “[produce] female offspring with higher rates of …fecundity” if the relevant males do not exclusively engage in same-sex sexual behaviors.

If the relevant males are exclusive, practicing or non-practicing “homosexuals,” then it is clear that no offspring whatever will result and even the “evolutionary advantage” hypothesized by these researchers will come to naught.

CONCLUSION:

What is there, then, for “pro-homosexual” activists to celebrate?

If we take the article’s claims at face-value, then what we “discover” is not any definite “evolutionary advantage,” but only a hypothetical one. Generally, this speculated advantage rests upon observations made about fewer than 1% of the animal species on the planet. Specifically, at least as formulated in the article, the hypothesis turns upon various “same-sex sexual behaviors” (including “singing”) observed of inbred fruit flies in a laboratory setting. Finally, even if (contrary to my intuitions) these shaky foundations hold, one does not get to the conclusion that exclusive “same-sex sexual behavior” is somehow “beneficial.” After all is said and done, the male “homosexuals” in view still have to mate with females in order to produce the offspring that, the study alleges, might end up enjoying the conjectural survival advantage.

Personally, I do not see much here that would actually be of interest to “pro-homosexual activists.”

Tuesday, December 24, 2013

Bill O'Reilly, Political Alchemy, & the Ambiguity of 'Judging'

Presently, there is a “working” in political alchemy radiating its transmuting energy from the electronic athanor that is the mass media.[1]

Self-proclaimed “left-liberals”[2] who, until recently, more or less dependably voiced their implacable – and commendable – opposition to “corporate tyrannies,” now can oft be heard defending the “rights” of corporate Behemoths like A&E (technically, it is a limited liability company, I believe) to suppress the individual liberties of their employees. This suppression takes place in a roundabout way, for it is built into employment or contractor agreements.

In this way, so-called “left-liberals” who would never stand for an employment contract forbidding, as a term of employment, participation in particular sexual relationships, profess to stand by A&E as it upholds, as perfectly legitimate, an agreement forbidding expression of particular religious opinions.

Adding another dimension to this radical platform-inverting operation, the supposedly “right-conservative”[3] talk show host Bill O’Reilly just became “an unexpected ally” of “the left”.[4]

O’Reilly stated:

“Mr. Robertson, I believe, made a mistake by the condemnation line. It’s not about the Bible, or believing, or not believing in the Bible. It’s singling out a group, it could be any group, and saying to that group, ‘Hey, you are not worthy in the eyes of the Lord, or in the eyes of God. You are not worthy because of who you are.’ So once you get that personal, once you get down and into that kind of a realm, problems arise. ...I’m just going by Luke. I’m going by what the Bible says.”[5]

O’Reilly refers to comments made in GQ magazine by “reality-television” personality Phil Robertson, who alluded to a passage of the Bible (1 Corinthians 6:9-10). Robertson stated:

“Don’t be deceived. Neither the adulterers, the idolaters, the male prostitutes, the homosexual offenders, the greedy, the drunkards, the slanderers, the swindlers — they won’t inherit the kingdom of God. Don’t deceive yourself. It’s not right.”[6]

O’Reilly goes further, remarking that:

“If you adhere to the Christian philosophy you know that Jesus was quite clear, all judgments about the consequences of sin are to be made by God and God alone. We’re all sinners, and because of that the Gospel of Luke 6:37, mandates -- mandates that Christian human beings refrain from judging others. Again, that is God’s prerogative.”

A cynic might suspect that O’Reilly’s comments were carefully crafted to tap into, or take advantage of, the current “all ya need is no-judging” mantra. However, O’Reilly, as well as others advancing this “politically-correct,” but uncritical, slogan – knowingly or unknowingly – makes several errors.[7]

For the present, let us ignore all of these except two that are perhaps the most glaring.

Number one, contrary to what O’Reilly claims, Jesus did not lay down a blanket prohibition against “judging.”

In fact, Jesus issues this command: “Stop judging by mere appearances, and make a right judgment.”[8] This comports with the words of Saint Paul, who informs us that “[t]he person with the Spirit makes judgments about all things…”.[9]

The contest, therefore, is not between “judging” (which is supposedly “bad”) and “not-judging” (which is supposedly “good”). The contrast is between judgments that are right, just, and spiritually-grounded and those that are wrong, unjust, and superficial.

O’Reilly’s concentration on Luke 6:37 illicitly truncates the presentation of the New Testament’s testimony concerning “judging.” He merely ignores the inconvenient evidence.

There is yet another difficulty, however. O’Reilly’s attempted exposition (such as it is) of Luke 6:37 runs aground because it is built on several ambiguities. Let me focus on the ambiguity that is perhaps the most salient.[10]

Number two, the word “judge” is ambiguous.

In fact, it has no fewer than four different senses, which I will illustrate by way of the well-known tale, found in John 8:1-11, of the “woman caught in the act of adultery.”[11]

Here is the entire relevant passage, from the NIV:

[B]ut Jesus went to the Mount of Olives. At dawn he appeared again in the temple courts, where all the people gathered around him, and he sat down to teach them. The teachers of the law and the Pharisees brought in a woman caught in adultery. They made her stand before the group and said to Jesus, “Teacher, this woman was caught in the act of adultery. In the Law Moses commanded us to stone such women. Now what do you say?” They were using this question as a trap, in order to have a basis for accusing him. But Jesus bent down and started to write on the ground with his finger. When they kept on questioning him, he straightened up and said to them, “Let any one of you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her.” Again he stooped down and wrote on the ground. At this, those who heard began to go away one at a time, the older ones first, until only Jesus was left, with the woman still standing there. Jesus straightened up and asked her, “Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?” “No one, sir,” she said. “Then neither do I condemn you,” Jesus declared. “Go now and leave your life of sin.”

Before I remark about the above passage, it would be helpful to get a bit clear concerning the form of a moral argument. In a simple moral argument, one may begin with two premises. The first premise lays down a moral principle or rule. The second premise articulates a particular, relevant case. From these two premises, we may conclude something about the case, in virtue of what the moral precept prescribes for it. An example would help to clarify.

Let’s lay down (what I hope is) an uncontroversial moral principle, and let is serve as premise 1:

(1) It is morally wrong to torture and kill children.

Unfortunately, there is a particular, relevant case in which a man violates this moral precept.

(2) Albert Fish tortured and killed children.

We may draw the following conclusion:

(3) Therefore, Albert Fish did something that is morally wrong.

Besides this (I hope obvious) moral conclusion, we may also be interested in certain punitive measures.[12] For instance, we may wish to add something like the following into the mix.

(4) Anyone who tortures and kills children should either receive life in prison without the possibility of parole or the death penalty (etc.).

From this new premise, we can draw a further conclusion, as follows.

(5) Therefore, Albert Fish should either receive life in prison without the possibility of parole or the death penalty (etc.).

With just this much in place, we may detect that there are at least five different “judgments” involved in this moral argument – which argument is in a standard form that is typical of many moral arguments.

Firstly, there is the moral judgment that the asserted ethical principle is a correct one. In the above example, our first judgment might be this: “Yes, it really is wrong to torture and kill children.”

Secondly, there is the factual judgment that the case has been represented correctly. So we may say: “Yes, Albert Fish really did torture and kill children.”

Thirdly, there is the judgment that the moral principle governs the case at hand. In the present example this seems obvious, but it is often a bit trickier. Presently, we say something like: “Yes, the prohibition on torturing and killing kids really does apply to Albert Fish.”

Hopefully, up to this point, I haven’t said anything particularly controversial.

Fourthly, there is the judgment that a particular punitive measure is just. This is often a lot more contentious. I have tried to minimize this problem, here, by giving the reader a choice between either of two different punishments. We can say that a person who agrees with the justice of the suggested punishments will say: “Yes, anyone who tortures and kills kids really should be thrown into prison for life or executed.”

Fifthly, there is the judgment that the case at hand ought to be dealt with by actually implementing the suggested punishment. So, finally, a person agreeing to this final step may say: “Yes, Albert Fish really should be thrown into prison for life or executed.”

The question is this: If the story of the woman caught in adultery is a story that illustrates the injustice in a certain sort of judgment, which of these five judgments sorts is it?

Let us have a look at the case of the woman caught in adultery. As an argument, the story may be laid out as follows.

(6) Adultery is morally wrong.

(7) “[T]his woman was caught in the act of adultery.”

(8) Therefore, “this woman” has done something morally wrong.

(9) Women who have committed adultery should be “stoned” (to death).

(10) Therefore, “this woman” should be stoned (to death).

At what step does Jesus intervene? We will examine each relevant judgment.

Judgment #1 would be something like the following. “Yes, adultery really is morally wrong. Jesus never disputes the wrongness of adultery. He never questions the moral premise.

Elsewhere, Jesus even arguably extends adultery to lustful thoughts.

“You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’ But I tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart. If your right eye causes you to stumble, gouge it out and throw it away. It is better for you to lose one part of your body than for your whole body to be thrown into hell. And if your right hand causes you to stumble, cut it off and throw it away. It is better for you to lose one part of your body than for your whole body to go into hell.”[13]

Not only does Jesus broaden the definition of adultery to encompass fantasy and not only actual, physical encounters, but we also have the ultimate punishment: hell.

This does not appear at all consistent with the notion that Jesus denies the sin of adultery.

In fact, though, we can something more strongly about the passage from John’s Gospel. In the story of the woman caught in adultery, Jesus actually seems to endorse the wrongness of adultery.

At the conclusion of the passage Jesus tells the woman to “Go now and leave your life of sin.” If the woman is commanded to “leave [her] life of sin,” then, plausibly, she is presently leading a life of sin.

The only relevant information that we have about her life is that she is an adulteress. Therefore, Jesus is either (and implausibly) speaking of “other” sins that go unmentioned; or Jesus is speaking of her adultery as a sin. The most natural reading of the text is indisputably that Jesus is here saying that the woman’s adulterous behavior is tantamount to “leading a life of sin.” But, if so, then Jesus is acknowledging that adultery is morally wrong.

Notice that Jesus’s ideological foes – the self-righteous and self-deluded Pharisees – got the moral principle right.

How did they do this? Apparently, on this occasion at least, they simply read the Old Testament and reported its contents faithfully. (Keep this in mind with respect to the case of Phil Robertson.)

The Old Testament clearly states that “[i]f a man commits adultery with another man’s wife …both the adulterer and the adulteress must be put to death.”[14]

The Pharisees, despite having logs in their eyes, nevertheless got the moral precept correct, and Jesus acknowledges the principle’s correctness.

Therefore, whatever this passage does show, it certainly does not show that people are entirely unable to report true moral principles. Even sinful people can read the Bible and, at least occasionally, find and report on true moral precepts.

Hence, when O’Reilly maintains that “judgments” must be “made by ...God alone”, Robertson can happily concede the point. God did make the “judgment,” as reported in 1 Corinthians 6:9-10. Robertson merely quotes God’s judgment. (Remember, O’Reilly is addressing people who “adhere to the Christian philosophy”.)

Judgment #2 would come down to something like: “Yes, this woman (pointing) really did commit adultery.”

There is not much to say, here, except to point out that Jesus never disputes this either. There is no hint in the passage that the relevant woman has been wrongly accused or “framed” or anything remotely similar.

Judgment #3 would be that: “Yes, the moral premise really does apply to the case at hand.”

Jesus does not dispute this. Jesus does not say that the governing moral principle has been incorrectly applied. Jesus’s position seems to be that adultery is wrong and “this woman” ought to have made her decisions such as to have taken the wrongness of adultery seriously. This is why, at the end, she is told to quit her sinful ways.

Judgment #4, for a person in agreement, might sound like: “Yes, a man and a woman who commit adultery really should be stoned to death.”

Jesus seems to imply that the punishment is, in principle, just.

How so? He states: “Let any one of you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her.”

Significantly, he does not say: “There should be no throwing of stones at all” or “come on, people, that was so ‘Old Testament’,” or any such thing.[15]

So far, then, Jesus seems to agree that we have (i.) a true moral principle, (ii.) a true factual premise, (iii.) a just punitive measure, and (iv.) an appropriate relationship amongst the moral, factual, and punitive premises.

What then does Jesus object to?

Remember that we earlier identified a fifth sort of judgment. To be exact, we had the judgment that a particular case ought to be dealt with by actually implementing such-and-so punitive measure.

In the Albert Fish example, we first (hypothetically) agreed to the implementation of life imprisonment or execution in cases where people torture and kill children. But then since the case of Albert Fish was a case in which a person tortured and killed children, we (again, hypothetically) reached the punitive conclusion that: “Yes, Albert Fish really should be thrown into prison for life or executed.”

Most obviously, in the case of the woman caught in adultery, this is the point at which Jesus objects.

He halts the immediate implementation of the punishment.

This is the essence of the "age of Grace" that Jesus ushered in. The punishments demanded by the laws of the ancient Hebrew theocracy have been put into abeyance. Jesus came to offer forgiveness and mercy. This punishment abrogation does not, however, involve the repealing of the moral law. The two levels - that of moral rightness/wrongness and that of punitive appropriateness/inappropriateness - are both logically and practically distinct.

Whereas the Pharisees wished to stone her to death without delay, Jesus instead shamed them into foregoing this hasty execution. To accomplish this, he used the words already twice quoted: “Let any one of you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her.”

I submit that the most plausible explanation for Jesus stopping here, despite his acceptance of every judgment that we previously outlined, is as follows.

Jesus is teaching us, by His example, to acknowledge that sinful people should not be anxious to punish others – particularly with the ultimate sentence: death – even in cases of demonstrable sin.

The sinfulness of adultery was never disputed.

The guilt of the woman was not disputed.

The applicability of the prohibition of adultery to this woman was not called into question.

Even the justice of the punishment – in principle – was implicit.

What Jesus encourages, however, is that this woman be shown mercy instead of justice.

Quite plausibly, the Christian should feel a pressure to emulate Jesus’s example. If Christians do so, we might suppose that it would take the following shape.

The Christian can say: Sodomy is morally wrong.

Considering a case where John Doe and Joe Schmo engage in sodomy, we can say, unhesitatingly, and based on the clear precedent of Scripture, that they have done something morally wrong.

The point, here, is that going this far is perfectly in line with Jesus’s example – not to mention with thousands of years of Christian understanding concerning homosexual sex acts.

Probably, the Christian should stop here.

What Jesus seemingly discourages is the sort of “judgment” whereby one presumes to be authorized to carry out a definitive punitive measure on a person – in the illustration, the death penalty – even in a case where the guilt and guiding moral precepts are obvious.

Plausibly, this is why St. Peter, the Apostle, exhorts his listeners to “[r]epent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins”,[16] as opposed to rounding up a posse to stone the ne’er-do-wells.

Peter was merely following Jesus’s lead, since from the beginning of His public ministry He “began to preach, ‘Repent, for the kingdom of heaven has come near.’”[17]

We see then that, on Jesus’s authority, the only people – to again borrow O’Reilly’s phraseology – of whom it is “said you are not going to go to heaven”, are the unrepentant.

Whatever the sin (drunkenness, adultery, sodomy, etc.), the “condemnation line” is drawn between those that repent and those that do not.

This line was not marked by you or me or Phil Robertson. No, for those who “adhere to the Christian philosophy”, the line was drawn by God Himself, as reported in the Bible.

The choice is between the Biblical worldview – the one in which drunkenness, adultery, and sodomy (among many other things that we could list) are, for some people more than others, tantalizingly tempting but sinful actions to be eschewed – and the worldview now ascendant – in which “polyamory,” “cheating,” “swinging,” and “LGBT” are “lifestyle choices.”

Practically, although the Christian ought to testify to the sinfulness of homosexual sex acts (along with other forms of sin, such as those that Robertson also listed), following Jesus’s example, said Christian would not agitate for the implementation of Old Testament legal penalties, but would rather enjoin the guilty just as Jesus would – and did:

“Go now and leave your life of sin.”[18]



[1] Large portions of this post have been adapted from a – so far unpublished – monograph on homosexuality: Matthew Bell, “Blueprint for the Opposition to ‘Gay’ Marriage.”

[2] Personally, I believe that the terms “left” and “right” are useless descriptors. In fact, more often they are less-than-useless, pigeonholing people into constrictive categories, or impelling people to adopt, wholesale and uncritically, multiple positions that are, in fact, logically quite separate (and which should, therefore, be evaluated quite independently).

As Wikipedia states a historical matter: “The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ appeared during the French Revolution of 1789 when members of the National Assembly divided into supporters of the king to the president's right and supporters of the revolution to his left.”

[3] I register awareness that O'Reilly has disclaimed the label "conversative," in favor of alternates such as "traditionalist" or even, apparently, "libertarian." But see “Conservative U.S. anchor now skeptical about Bush,” Reuters via Union-Tribune [San Diego], Feb. 10, 2004, <http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/nation/20040210-0550-campaign-bush-oreilly.html>. See, also, note #2.

[4] Tal Kopan, “Bill O’Reilly criticizes 'Duck Dynasty' star,” Politico, Dec. 20, 2013, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/bill-oreilly-duck-dynasty-101368.html>.

[5] Quoted in ibid.

[6] Quoted in ibid.

[7] In the first place, attributing, as O’Reilly does, “the condemnation line” to Robertson, as though Robertson was pontificating, is patently wrong-headed. We may even borrow O’Reilly’s remark, here. “It’s not about ...believing, or not believing in the Bible.” It’s simply a matter of accurately reproducing the text of the Bible. 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 in fact states:

“[D]o you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor men who have sex with men nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of God.”

Whatever the “condemnation,” it does not originate with Robertson.

[8] John 7:24.

[9] 1 Corinthians 2:15.

[10] Other ambiguities can be mentioned as well. One such is closely related to the error previously mentioned. The ambiguity is this: “all judgments about the consequences of sin are to be made by God and God alone” is ambiguous because the phrase “judgments ...made by ...God alone” has two different senses.

Number one, we could mean that, as a matter of communication, God alone is able to say anything at all about the consequences of sin. On this reading, no one but God can make any remarks whatsoever about sin. Another ambiguity lurking about is whether this restriction is supposed to be epistemological or practical or something else.

Number two, we could mean that, as a matter of metaphysics, God alone is able to set the actual consequences of sin. On this reading, no one but God can determine what “consequences” sin has. There are additional ambiguities in the vicinity of this view as well. For example, “consequence” is ambiguous between (at least) what we might (somewhat impressionistically term) “consequence”-as-”punishment” and “consequence”-as-”effect”.

Let us leave these aside, for the time being, and focus on the more important (in my view) ambiguity of the word “judge” itself.

[11] This case is strange for several reasons. One difficulty was that the relevant man would also be subject to stoning, and yet the relevant man never enters into the picture in this regard. However, Jesus does not appeal to this fact – which appears, admittedly, a violation of justice – as the reason why the woman should not be stoned. Second, even if the woman were justly condemned, it seems to be a miscarriage of due process to allow a “wildcat” band of Pharisees to function on the spot as judge, jury, and executioner. Again, Jesus does not appeal to this either. He merely gestures towards the rightness of mercy. Finally, I wish to register my awareness of the “textual-critical” difficulties with this passage. I set these aside as irrelevant for present purposes chiefly because this example is one that the sodomy-proponents themselves cite. Therefore, my analysis is merely a response to a text that such proponents often chose to make a fixture of their arguments. I submit that my treatment of this passage (ignoring the textual difficulties) is, therefore, appropriate.

[12] I intend “punitive” to function as a neutral term. “Punitive” measures could veer off into more specialized sorts of rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, and so on. These discussions lie too far afield, presently.

[13] Matthew 5:27-30.

[14] Leviticus 20:10.

[15] The historic Christian confession is that Jesus is the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Moreover, the same Christian confession holds that God inspired the Bible, including the Old Testament. But if God inspired the Old Testament, then God inspired the punitive measures outlined in the Old Testament. And if God exists as a Trinity, then the First, Second, and Third Persons of that Trinity inspired the punitive measures in the Old Testament. But if so, Jesus inspired the punitive measures in the Old Testament. Therefore, he is unlikely to disagree with them.

[16] Acts 2:38.

[17] Matthew 4:17.

[18] Christians are not supposed to exempt themselves in this. Far from it! Collectively, we are called to “encourage one another and build each other up”, 1 Thessalonians 5:11. Individually, we are enjoined to “[e]xamine yourselves to see whether you are in the faith; test yourselves”, 2 Corinthians 13:5. There is no “self-righteousness in this. Like Isaiah, I can truly say of myself: “Woe to me! I am ruined! For I am a man of unclean lips”, Isaiah 6:5. Like Isaiah, too, “I live among a people of unclean lips…,” ibid.

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

Question Everything? Why?

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(Source)

This particular Facebook polemic exhorts us to "question everything."

Why? (<-- Get it?)

Facetiousness aside, let me make a few prefatory remarks. I am sympathetic to investigation. Personally, I love learning. I consider myself very inquisitive. And I would never stifle the innocent and genuine questioning of a child.

However, "question everything" strikes me as a sort of platitude that, while it sounds like a high-minded and enlightened thing to say, really is both logically problematic as well as utterly impractical.

One way to construe the principle is as strict and literal advice. Taken literally, "question everything" would launch one on a vicious infinite regress. One would literally believe nothing whatsoever, entertaining only iterative questions.

For example, and so that I may not be accused of special pleading on behalf of pet theistic conclusions, no one would ever get to the point where one would be justified saying, "I believe that atheism is true." This is because, at any point one wishes to sample, there would always be only a question. One would forever be questioning atheism; or questioning one's questioning of atheism; or questioning one's questioning of one's questioning of atheism; and so on, ad infinitum. (Note: I am not endorsing atheism.)

There is no room on this view for concluding anything - ever.

I do not think that anyone actually does function this way. In fact, I suspect that it would be practically impossible to do so.

Therefore, the "question everything" model, if taken strictly literally, appears to be nonsensical.

There is another way to take "question everything." One could, for example, take the phrase as a label for some sort of sophomoric, adversarial game, like kids who just reiterate "why?" questions to be pains in the ass.

I take it that this sort of "questioning" may be summarily dismissed. It is patently unhelpful and disingenuous.

Although, perhaps this is too quick. Possibly "question everything" is merely intended to be a heuristic device. Maybe it is simply an abbreviation for some generic encouragement towards learning.

I can accept the principle if it is taken in this qualified sense, as an encouragement towards learning.

Note well, though, that because no one can entertain only an infinite regress of questions, it is necessary to model the sort of learning that we are encouraging in a way that does not take literally the exhortation to "question everything."

Elsewhere, I have drawn a sort of analogy to hunting. There are (at least) two types of hunting. Let's call the first type "sport hunting." If one is "sport hunting," then it doesn't really matter if one catches anything. So too, in the sophomoric question-parade, the aim seemingly isn't anything other than to entertain oneself, pass the time, or, in the worst case, to disconcert one's interlocutor.

The other type of hunting, however, might be called "serious hunting." In "serious hunting," it matters quite a lot whether, in the end, one catches anything or not. If one fails to catch something, then one's hunt has not been successful. In this way, serious hunting is akin to serious questioning.

In my view, serious questioning aims to discover the truth. This is not to say that the truth is easy to discover. But it is to say that when we state the the aim of asking questions, we will do better to say that - in principle - the aim is to get the correct answers. For anything less than this aim is either a childish game or a futile and endless endeavor.

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Saturday, April 6, 2013

Argument from Disanalogy against a Bio-Mechanical View of the Human Body

...Science states that certain organs function automatically or mechanically, but occultism realizes that there is nothing mechanical about the functions of the human body. Let us take as an example a workman throwing a piece of iron among the wheels and levers of a smoothly working machine. There is a grinding crash and the machine stops. If on the other hand you figuratively throw a monkey-wrench into the human body, it will immediately begin the process of throwing it back at you. It will surround the foreign element with a coating and try to absorb it. If this is impossible, it will try to eject it through some channel appointed for that purpose. If this means fails it will in many cases accustom itself to the presence of the obstacle and keep right on working anyway. This shows unmistakably that the organic parts of man possess some inherent form of intelligence; therefore they are not machines, for no mechanical device is capable of intelligence.
Source: Manly Palmer Hall, The Occult Anatomy of Man (Los Angeles: The Philosophical Research Society, 1997), p. 28.